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Solved Unit42 from Hack The Box!

When a phishing email leads to a backdoored remote-access tool, every Sysmon EventID tells part of the story. This walkthrough follows the Unit42 UltraVNC campaign from initial access to self-termination, using only Sysmon logs plus chainsaw and jq.

[!NOTE] Scenario The attacker distributed a backdoored build of UltraVNC through Dropbox. The victim downloads Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe — a double-extension executable — which drops a full UltraVNC toolset and performs several defensive-evasion steps (timestomping, connectivity checks) before terminating itself.

At a Glance

Field Value
Platform Hack The Box — Sherlock: Unit42
Category DFIR / Incident Response
Malware Backdoored UltraVNC
Distribution vector Dropbox (Mark-of-the-Web)
Analysis tools chainsaw (EVTX→JSON) · jq
Key Sysmon EventIDs 11, 1, 15, 2, 22, 3, 5

Investigation

Q1 — How many Event logs are there with Event ID 11?

[!TIP] Answer: 56

[!NOTE] Method — Dump the Sysmon EVTX log to JSON, then aggregate EventIDs with a count per value.

chainsaw dump Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational.evtx -j > sysmon.json

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | .Event.System.EventID' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
      1 10
      1 3
      1 5
      2 15
      2 26
      3 22
      6 1
      7 17
     14 12
     15 7
     16 2
     19 13
     26 23
     56 11

[!NOTE] Why Event ID 11? It logs file creation. The heavy count of 56 flags an executable that aggressively drops files on disk — the first hint of a payload.

Q2 — What is the malicious process that infected the victim’s system?

[!TIP] Answer: Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe

[!NOTE] Method — Filter Event ID 1 (process creation) and inspect every CommandLine.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==1) | .Event.EventData.CommandLine'

Among the noise stands a double extension: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe. A legitimate .exe would never be named …exe.exe. Shortly after, msiexec installs a component from AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\… — a masquerading install path.

Q3 — Which Cloud drive was used to distribute the malware?

[!TIP] Answer: Dropbox

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 15 logs the Mark of the Web (Zone.Identifier). It records exactly where a downloaded file came from.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==15) | .Event.EventData'
{
  "EventID": 15,
  "Image": "C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
  "TargetFilename": "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe:Zone.Identifier",
  "Contents": "[ZoneTransfer]
    ZoneId=3
    ReferrerUrl=https://www.dropbox.com/
    HostUrl=https://uc2f030016253ec53f...dl.dropboxusercontent.com/..."
}

ZoneId=3 (Internet zone) + ReferrerUrl: dropbox.com = the file was delivered from Dropbox and flagged by SmartScreen as coming from the web.

Q4 — What was the timestamp changed to for the PDF file?

[!TIP] Answer: 2024-01-14 08:10:06 (PDF: TempFolder\~.pdf)

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 2 logs file-creation-time changes (timestomping). Filter by the malicious process and look at TargetFilename.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
  select(.Event.System.EventID==2 and
         .Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
  "\(.Event.EventData.CreationUtcTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetFilename)"'
2024-01-14 08:10:06.029 --> ...\TempFolder\~.pdf

[!WARNING] Timestomping — 16 files were backdated to appear older. Most were set to 2024-01-10, but the PDF was set to 2024-01-14 to match the “Preventivo 24.02.14” (italian for quote 24/02/14) lure document metadata.

Q5 — Where was “once.cmd” created on disk?

[!TIP] Answer: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\Photo and vn 1.1.2\install\F97891C\WindowsVolume\Games\once.cmd

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 11 logs file creation. Reusing the same filter, list every file the malicious process dropped.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
  select(.Event.System.EventID==11 and
         .Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
  .Event.EventData.TargetFilename'
...\WindowsVolume\Games\c.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\cmmc.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\on.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\once.cmd      <-- answer
...\WindowsVolume\Games\taskhost.exe
...\WindowsVolume\Games\viewer.exe

A deeply nested AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\… path used to masquerade as a legitimate photo application, hiding the UltraVNC toolset in plain sight.

Q6 — What domain did it try to connect to as a connectivity check?

[!TIP] Answer: www.example.com

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 22 logs DNS queries. Filter by the malicious process.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
  select(.Event.System.EventID==22 and
         .Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
  .Event.EventData.QueryName'
{ "QueryName": "www.example.com", "QueryStatus": 0, "QueryResults": "199.43.135.53;..." }

www.example.com is an IANA-reserved domain. Malware uses it as a cheap internet-ping: if the DNS query succeeds (status 0), the machine is online and the payload proceeds.

Q7 — Which IP address did the malicious process try to reach?

[!TIP] Answer: 93.184.216.34:80

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 3 logs network connections.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
  select(.Event.System.EventID==3 and
         .Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
  "\(.Event.EventData.SourceIp) --> \(.Event.EventData.DestinationIp):\(.Event.EventData.DestinationPort)"'
172.17.79.132 --> 93.184.216.34:80

Two-step connectivity check: Q6 confirms the DNS resolution returned the reserved IP, Q7 confirms a live TCP connection on port 80 — together proving the sandbox/host is not isolated before infection proceeds.

Q8 — When did the malicious process terminate itself?

[!TIP] Answer: 2024-02-14 03:41:58 UTC

[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 5 logs process termination.

cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
  select(.Event.System.EventID==5 and
         .Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe")'
{ "EventID": 5, "UtcTime": "2024-02-14 03:41:58.795", "ProcessId": 10672,
  "Image": "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe" }

The dropper self-terminates at 2024-02-14 03:41:58 UTC immediately after dropping and installing the backdoored UltraVNC — the infection is now handled by the persistent payload, not the initial dropper.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Value Type Notes
Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe Malicious dropper Double extension, self-terminating
www.example.com → 93.184.216.34:80 Connectivity check IANA reserved domain
dropboxusercontent.com Distribution Mark-of-the-Web (Event ID 15)
TempFolder\~.pdf Timestomped artifact Backdated to 2024-01-14 08:10:06
Photo and Fax Vn\…\WindowsVolume\Games\ Payload path Masquerades as photo app
once.cmd, c.cmd, cmmc.cmd, on.cmd Persistence/exec scripts Dropped together at 03:41:58

Key Takeaways

  • Event ID 11 (file create) is your first tripwire for “point-of-sale style” droppers.
  • Event ID 15 (MOTW) traces the delivery vector — always check Zone.Identifier.
  • Event ID 2 catches timestomping; compare CreationUtcTime vs PreviousCreationUtcTime.
  • Event ID 22 + 3 chain together: DNS lookup → TCP connect = classic sandbox/connectivity check.
  • Event ID 5 (termination) shows when a dropper folds itself after persistence is achieved.

References