Unit42 Sherlock Walkthrough
DFIR investigation of a backdoored UltraVNC campaign: Sysmon Event IDs, Mark-of-the-Web, timestomping, and internet connectivity checks.
Solved Unit42 from Hack The Box!
When a phishing email leads to a backdoored remote-access tool, every Sysmon EventID tells part of the story. This walkthrough follows the Unit42 UltraVNC campaign from initial access to self-termination, using only Sysmon logs plus chainsaw and jq.
[!NOTE] Scenario The attacker distributed a backdoored build of UltraVNC through Dropbox. The victim downloads
Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe— a double-extension executable — which drops a full UltraVNC toolset and performs several defensive-evasion steps (timestomping, connectivity checks) before terminating itself.
At a Glance
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Platform | Hack The Box — Sherlock: Unit42 |
| Category | DFIR / Incident Response |
| Malware | Backdoored UltraVNC |
| Distribution vector | Dropbox (Mark-of-the-Web) |
| Analysis tools | chainsaw (EVTX→JSON) · jq |
| Key Sysmon EventIDs | 11, 1, 15, 2, 22, 3, 5 |
Investigation
Q1 — How many Event logs are there with Event ID 11?
[!TIP] Answer:
56
[!NOTE] Method — Dump the Sysmon EVTX log to JSON, then aggregate EventIDs with a count per value.
chainsaw dump Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational.evtx -j > sysmon.json
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | .Event.System.EventID' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n
1 10
1 3
1 5
2 15
2 26
3 22
6 1
7 17
14 12
15 7
16 2
19 13
26 23
56 11
[!NOTE] Why Event ID 11? It logs file creation. The heavy count of
56flags an executable that aggressively drops files on disk — the first hint of a payload.
Q2 — What is the malicious process that infected the victim’s system?
[!TIP] Answer:
Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe
[!NOTE] Method — Filter Event ID 1 (process creation) and inspect every
CommandLine.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==1) | .Event.EventData.CommandLine'
Among the noise stands a double extension: C:\Users\CyberJunkie\Downloads\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe. A legitimate .exe would never be named …exe.exe. Shortly after, msiexec installs a component from AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\… — a masquerading install path.
Q3 — Which Cloud drive was used to distribute the malware?
[!TIP] Answer:
Dropbox
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 15 logs the Mark of the Web (Zone.Identifier). It records exactly where a downloaded file came from.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] | select(.Event.System.EventID==15) | .Event.EventData'
{
"EventID": 15,
"Image": "C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe",
"TargetFilename": "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe:Zone.Identifier",
"Contents": "[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3
ReferrerUrl=https://www.dropbox.com/
HostUrl=https://uc2f030016253ec53f...dl.dropboxusercontent.com/..."
}
ZoneId=3 (Internet zone) + ReferrerUrl: dropbox.com = the file was delivered from Dropbox and flagged by SmartScreen as coming from the web.
Q4 — What was the timestamp changed to for the PDF file?
[!TIP] Answer:
2024-01-14 08:10:06(PDF:TempFolder\~.pdf)
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 2 logs file-creation-time changes (timestomping). Filter by the malicious process and look at
TargetFilename.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
select(.Event.System.EventID==2 and
.Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
"\(.Event.EventData.CreationUtcTime) --> \(.Event.EventData.TargetFilename)"'
2024-01-14 08:10:06.029 --> ...\TempFolder\~.pdf
[!WARNING] Timestomping — 16 files were backdated to appear older. Most were set to
2024-01-10, but the PDF was set to2024-01-14to match the “Preventivo 24.02.14” (italian for quote 24/02/14) lure document metadata.
Q5 — Where was “once.cmd” created on disk?
[!TIP] Answer:
C:\Users\CyberJunkie\AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\Photo and vn 1.1.2\install\F97891C\WindowsVolume\Games\once.cmd
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 11 logs file creation. Reusing the same filter, list every file the malicious process dropped.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
select(.Event.System.EventID==11 and
.Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
.Event.EventData.TargetFilename'
...\WindowsVolume\Games\c.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\cmmc.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\on.cmd
...\WindowsVolume\Games\once.cmd <-- answer
...\WindowsVolume\Games\taskhost.exe
...\WindowsVolume\Games\viewer.exe
A deeply nested AppData\Roaming\Photo and Fax Vn\… path used to masquerade as a legitimate photo application, hiding the UltraVNC toolset in plain sight.
Q6 — What domain did it try to connect to as a connectivity check?
[!TIP] Answer:
www.example.com
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 22 logs DNS queries. Filter by the malicious process.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
select(.Event.System.EventID==22 and
.Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
.Event.EventData.QueryName'
{ "QueryName": "www.example.com", "QueryStatus": 0, "QueryResults": "199.43.135.53;..." }
www.example.com is an IANA-reserved domain. Malware uses it as a cheap internet-ping: if the DNS query succeeds (status 0), the machine is online and the payload proceeds.
Q7 — Which IP address did the malicious process try to reach?
[!TIP] Answer:
93.184.216.34:80
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 3 logs network connections.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
select(.Event.System.EventID==3 and
.Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe") |
"\(.Event.EventData.SourceIp) --> \(.Event.EventData.DestinationIp):\(.Event.EventData.DestinationPort)"'
172.17.79.132 --> 93.184.216.34:80
Two-step connectivity check: Q6 confirms the DNS resolution returned the reserved IP, Q7 confirms a live TCP connection on port 80 — together proving the sandbox/host is not isolated before infection proceeds.
Q8 — When did the malicious process terminate itself?
[!TIP] Answer:
2024-02-14 03:41:58 UTC
[!NOTE] Method — Event ID 5 logs process termination.
cat sysmon.json | jq '.[] |
select(.Event.System.EventID==5 and
.Event.EventData.Image == "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe")'
{ "EventID": 5, "UtcTime": "2024-02-14 03:41:58.795", "ProcessId": 10672,
"Image": "C:\\Users\\CyberJunkie\\Downloads\\Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe" }
The dropper self-terminates at 2024-02-14 03:41:58 UTC immediately after dropping and installing the backdoored UltraVNC — the infection is now handled by the persistent payload, not the initial dropper.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Value | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
Preventivo24.02.14.exe.exe |
Malicious dropper | Double extension, self-terminating |
www.example.com → 93.184.216.34:80 |
Connectivity check | IANA reserved domain |
dropboxusercontent.com |
Distribution | Mark-of-the-Web (Event ID 15) |
TempFolder\~.pdf |
Timestomped artifact | Backdated to 2024-01-14 08:10:06 |
Photo and Fax Vn\…\WindowsVolume\Games\ |
Payload path | Masquerades as photo app |
once.cmd, c.cmd, cmmc.cmd, on.cmd |
Persistence/exec scripts | Dropped together at 03:41:58 |
Key Takeaways
- Event ID 11 (file create) is your first tripwire for “point-of-sale style” droppers.
- Event ID 15 (MOTW) traces the delivery vector — always check
Zone.Identifier. - Event ID 2 catches timestomping; compare
CreationUtcTimevsPreviousCreationUtcTime. - Event ID 22 + 3 chain together: DNS lookup → TCP connect = classic sandbox/connectivity check.
- Event ID 5 (termination) shows when a dropper folds itself after persistence is achieved.