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Solved RogueOne from Hack The Box!

Attack Timeline

Timestamp (UTC) Event Evidence Source
2023-08-10 11:30:03 Malicious svchost.exe (PID 6812) executed from C:\Users\simon.stark\Downloads\ and C2 channel established to 13.127.155.166:8888 windows.netscan, windows.cmdline
2023-08-10 11:30:57 cmd.exe (PID 4364) spawned by malicious process for interactive command execution windows.pstree
2023-08-10 11:30:57 conhost.exe (PID 9204) spawned automatically by cmd.exe windows.pstree
2023-08-10 ~11:30+ SIEM generates multiple C2 communication alerts Scenario description
2023-08-10 11:58:10 Malware sample first submitted to VirusTotal by reverse engineering team VirusTotal

Key observation: The entire attack — from initial execution to active C2 communication to interactive shell access — took less than 1 minute. This indicates an automated implant with pre-configured C2 callback, not manual exploitation.

Scenario: Your SIEM system generated multiple alerts in less than a minute, indicating potential C2 communication from Simon Stark’s workstation. Despite Simon not noticing anything unusual, the IT team had him share screenshots of his task manager to check for any unusual processes. No suspicious processes were found, yet alerts about C2 communications persisted. The SOC manager then directed the immediate containment of the workstation and a memory dump for analysis. As a memory forensics expert, you are tasked with assisting the SOC team at Forela to investigate and resolve this urgent incident.

Tools used: Volatility 3, strings/grep


Q1 — Please identify the malicious process and confirm process id of malicious process.

Answer: 6812

We used the windows.cmdline plugin to list all running processes along with their full command-line paths:

$ vol3 -f 20230810.mem windows.cmdline

q1_svchost_malicious.png
q1_svchost_malicious.png

Key indicators:

  • PID 6812 is running svchost.exe — a legitimate Windows process name
  • However, the path is C:\Users\simon.stark\Downloads\svchost.exe instead of the expected C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
  • This is a classic masquerading technique (MITRE T1036.005) — the attacker named the malicious binary after a legitimate system process to blend in
  • This also explains why Simon’s Task Manager didn’t raise suspicion — the process name appeared normal

Q2 — The SOC team believe the malicious process may spawned another process which enabled threat actor to execute commands. What is the process ID of that child process?

Answer: 4364

We used the windows.pstree plugin filtered by the malicious PID to view its child processes:

$ vol3 -f 20230810.mem windows.pstree --pid 6812

q2_pstree_child.png
q2_pstree_child.png

Key indicators:

  • PID 4364 — cmd.exe with PPID 6812 (our malicious svchost.exe) — this is the child process the threat actor used to execute commands
  • PID 9204 — conhost.exe with PPID 4364 — this is the Console Window Host automatically spawned by cmd.exe, which is expected behavior
  • Both processes were created at 2023-08-10 11:30:57 UTC, the same timestamp — indicating cmd.exe was spawned immediately by the C2 implant
  • A C2 agent spawning cmd.exe is a common post-exploitation pattern for interactive command execution

Q3 — The reverse engineering team need the malicious file sample to analyze. Your SOC manager instructed you to find the hash of the file and then forward the sample to reverse engineering team. Whats the md5 hash of the malicious file?

Answer: 5bd547c6f5bfc4858fe62c8867acfbb5

We used the windows.dumpfiles plugin to extract the malicious binary from memory, then hashed it:

$ vol3 -f 20230810.mem windows.dumpfiles --pid 6812
$ md5sum file.0x9e8b91ec0140.0x9e8b957f24c0.ImageSectionObject.svchost.exe.img
5bd547c6f5bfc4858fe62c8867acfbb5

q3_md5hash.png
q3_md5hash.png

Key indicators:

  • The --pid 6812 flag dumps all files associated with the malicious process, including loaded DLLs and the main executable
  • We hash the ImageSectionObject (svchost.exe.img), not the DataSectionObject (svchost.exe.dat) — the ImageSectionObject represents the actual PE executable as loaded into memory, which is the closest to the original binary on disk
  • The DataSectionObject is a data-level file mapping used for caching and may be incomplete or modified

Q4 — In order to find the scope of the incident, the SOC manager has deployed a threat hunting team to sweep across the environment for any indicator of compromise. It would be a great help to the team if you are able to confirm the C2 IP address and ports so our team can utilise these in their sweep.

Answer: 13.127.155.166:8888

We used the windows.netscan plugin to extract network connections and filtered for the malicious PID:

$ vol3 -f 20230810.mem windows.netscan > exported_files/netscan.txt
$ cat netscan.txt | grep 6812

q4_netscan_c2.png
q4_netscan_c2.png

Key indicators:

  • PID 6812 (svchost.exe) has an ESTABLISHED TCP connection to 13.127.155.166 on port 8888
  • The local machine IP is 172.17.79.131 using ephemeral port 64254
  • Port 8888 is a common port used by C2 frameworks (e.g., Metasploit, Cobalt Strike, custom implants)
  • The connection was established at 2023-08-10 11:30:03 UTC — this timestamp helps establish the initial compromise timeline
  • The 13.127.x.x range belongs to AWS ap-south-1 (Mumbai), which could indicate attacker-controlled cloud infrastructure

Q5 — We need a timeline to help us scope out the incident and help the wider DFIR team to perform root cause analysis. Can you confirm time the process was executed and C2 channel was established?

Answer: 10/08/2023 11:30:03

The answer was already visible from the netscan output used in Q4:

$ cat netscan.txt | grep 6812

q5_timeline_c2.png
q5_timeline_c2.png

Key indicators:

  • The netscan output shows the C2 connection was ESTABLISHED at 2023-08-10 11:30:03 UTC
  • This timestamp represents when the malicious svchost.exe (PID 6812) first connected to the C2 server at 13.127.155.166:8888
  • This correlates with the SIEM alerts that triggered the investigation
  • Note: the cmd.exe child process (PID 4364) was spawned at 11:30:57 UTC — roughly 54 seconds after the C2 channel was established, suggesting the attacker took nearly a minute to begin interactive command execution

Q6 — What is the memory offset of the malicious process?

Answer: 0x9e8b87762080

We used the previously exported windows.pslist output and filtered for the malicious PID:

$ cat exported_files/psslist.txt | grep 6812

q6_memory_offset.png
q6_memory_offset.png

Key indicators:

  • The Offset(V) column shows the virtual memory address of the process’s EPROCESS structure
  • PID 6812 (svchost.exe) resides at offset 0x9e8b87762080
  • This offset can be used to manually inspect the process’s kernel structure in memory, or as input for other Volatility plugins that accept a virtual offset (e.g., --offset)

Q7 — You successfully analyzed a memory dump and received praise from your manager. The following day, your manager requests an update on the malicious file. You check VirusTotal and find that the file has already been uploaded, likely by the reverse engineering team. Your task is to determine when the sample was first submitted to VirusTotal.

Answer: 10/08/2023 11:58:10

We searched the MD5 hash 5bd547c6f5bfc4858fe62c8867acfbb5 on VirusTotal and checked the Details tab under the History section:

q7_virustotal.png
q7_virustotal.png

Key indicators:

  • First Submission shows 2023-08-10 11:58:10 UTC — this is when the reverse engineering team uploaded the sample
  • This is only ~28 minutes after the C2 channel was established (11:30:03 UTC), showing a fast incident response turnaround
  • The Creation Time of 2010-04-14 22:06:53 UTC is likely a falsified PE timestamp — attackers often forge compilation timestamps to mislead analysts (a technique known as timestomping)