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Field Value
Category DFIR
Difficulty —
Status ✅ Completed
Date 2026-01-07
Hosts Client02 · Client03 · DC01
Stack Windows Event Logs · Sysmon · Splunk · Hayabusa · Chainsaw

Scenario

Blue team investigation of a suspected breach in an Active Directory environment named Main.local. The network includes a Domain Controller (DC01) and two client machines (Client02, Client03). A user on Client03 received a phishing email leading to a series of attacks that compromised the domain. Objective: reconstruct the attack chain, identify attacker actions, and uncover credentials, hashes, and persistence mechanisms using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon logs.


Attack Chain

# Timestamp (UTC) Process Action Artifact
01 2025-05-25 03:27:50 chrome.exe Malicious file downloaded Profits.docm ← ZonID=3 stamped · Sysmon ID 15
02 2025-05-25 03:28:04 WINWORD.EXE Opened in Protected View (sandbox) 140460DD.docm in oice_* temp · passive open
03 2025-05-25 03:28:58 WINWORD.EXE User enables macros — exits Protected View ~WRD0000.tmp created → VBA executes ⚠️
04 2025-05-25 03:29:04 WINWORD.EXE Reverse shell — C2 callback 192.168.204.152:4444 · Meterpreter · Sysmon ID 3
05 2025-05-25 03:32:15 powershell.exe Second-stage payload downloaded UpdatePolicy.exe → port 1337 reverse shell · PS ID 4104
06 2025-05-25 03:37:05 powershell.exe AD recon tool downloaded PowerView.ps1 · PS ID 4104
07 2025-05-25 03:37:19 powershell.exe AD enumeration — SPN accounts Get-DomainUser -SPN · PID 7924 · block 8/70 · fileless
08 2025-05-25 03:42:32 powershell.exe Kerberoasting — ticket extracted `Get-DomainUser -Identity sqlsvc
09 2025-05-25 04:03:47 — (Impacket) First login as sqlsvc — hash cracked NTLM V2 · Logon Type 3 · 192.168.204.152 → Client03 · ~26 min to crack
10 2025-05-25 04:05:12 VgYTbFEK.exe PsExec service binary created on Client03 C:\Windows\VgYTbFEK.exe · random name → avoids hash AV · Sysmon ID 11
11 2025-05-25 04:24:47 — (Impacket) Pass the Hash — lucas session on Client03 NTLM V2 · 192.168.204.152 → Client03 · Hayabusa flagged
12 2025-05-25 04:25:19 powershell.exe Mimikatz executed as netdiag.exe — LSASS dumped T1036 masquerade · DLL injection · NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
13 2025-05-25 04:26:36 netdiag.exe DCSync — AD replication to DC01 192.168.204.163:135 → :49668 · ID 4662 · T1003.006
14 2025-05-25 04:36:01 — (Impacket) First login as Administrator — DA hash used NTLM V2 · Logon Type 3 · ID 4624
15 2025-05-25 04:38:53 schtasks.exe Scheduled task created for persistence WindowsUpdateCheck → scvhost.exe · /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM
16 2025-05-25 04:40:09 reg.exe Registry Run key created for persistence HKCU\...\Run\xcvafctr → scvhost.exe
17 2025-05-25 04:43:01 sc.exe Windows service created for persistence WindowsUpdateSvc → scvhost.exe · start= auto

Key IOCs

Type Value Notes
C2 / Staging Server 192.168.204.152 Internal IP — served all payloads
Initial Payload Profits.docm Macro-enabled Word doc · phishing lure
C2 Ports 4444 / 1337 4444 = Meterpreter · 1337 = UpdatePolicy.exe shell
Second Stage UpdatePolicy.exe Downloaded via Invoke-WebRequest
Recon Tool PowerView.ps1 PowerSploit · @harmj0y · loaded fileless
Compromised Account MAIN\sqlsvc Service account · SPN set · Kerberoasted · weak password
Lateral Binary VgYTbFEK.exe PsExec random-name service binary · C:\Windows\
Credential Dumper netdiag.exe Mimikatz renamed · T1036 masquerading
Compromised Account lucas Cleartext dumped from LSASS via Pass the Hash + runas
Persistence Binary scvhost.exe Typosquat of svchost.exe · C:\Windows\System32\
Persistence — Service WindowsUpdateSvc Auto-start Windows service
Persistence — Task WindowsUpdateCheck Scheduled task on system start as SYSTEM
Persistence — Registry xcvafctr HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Questions & Answers


Q01 — What is the name of the malicious phishing attachment downloaded by the user on Client02?

Answer: Profits.docm

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=15
"Event.System.Channel"="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.TargetFilename,
        Event.EventData.Contents, Event.EventData.User

image.png
image.png

Notes: Sysmon ID 15 (FileCreateStreamHash) fires on every ADS write. The HostUrl field only appears in the Zone.Identifier once the download is complete — this is the event that confirms both the filename and the source URL.


Q02 — What is the IP address from which the malicious attachment was downloaded?

Answer: 192.168.204.152

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local" Event.System.EventID=15
| rex field=Event.EventData.Contents "HostUrl=(?<HostUrl>[^\s]+)"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.TargetFilename, HostUrl

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image.png

Notes: Answer is embedded in the Zone.Identifier ADS contents from Q01. Use rex to extract the HostUrl field cleanly — the URL contains the full source IP.


Q03 — After the victim opened the file, the malware initiated a network connection. What is the IP and port?

Answer: 192.168.204.152:4444

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local" 192.168.204.152 Event.System.EventID=3
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.User, Event.EventData.SourceIp,
        Event.EventData.SourcePort, Event.EventData.DestinationIp,
        Event.EventData.DestinationPort

image.png
image.png

Notes: Sysmon ID 3 (Network Connection) maps PID → IP:Port. Macro executed at 03:28:58, first C2 callback at 03:29:04 to port 4444 — classic Meterpreter default. Filter by known C2 IP to reduce noise.


Q04 — What is the name of the second-stage payload uploaded to Client02?

Answer: UpdatePolicy.exe

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 UpdatePolicy.exe Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

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image.png

Notes: PS ID 4104 captured the Invoke-WebRequest download command. File written to C:\Users\Jody\Downloads\UpdatePolicy.exe between 03:32:02–03:32:15. Filtering by the C2 IP + filename narrows results quickly.


Q05 — What port was used for the reverse shell from the second-stage payload on Client02?

Answer: 1337

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=3 UpdatePolicy.exe
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.DestinationIp, Event.EventData.DestinationPort
| where Event.EventData.DestinationPort != 4444

image.png
image.png

Notes: Visible in Q03 results. UpdatePolicy.exe connects on port 1337 — separate from Meterpreter on 4444. Two simultaneous C2 channels. Excluding port 4444 isolates the second shell cleanly.


Q06 — What tool did the attacker download to enumerate Active Directory?

Answer: PowerView.ps1

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 "Event.System.EventID"=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

image.png
image.png

Notes: PS ID 4104 shows Invoke-WebRequest downloading PowerView.ps1 at 03:37:05. PowerView is a PowerSploit module by @harmj0y used for AD enumeration and Kerberoasting. Loaded entirely in memory across 70 script blocks sharing the same ActivityID and PID 7924.


Q07 — What is the username of the targeted service account?

Answer: sqlsvc

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Get-DomainUser -Identity" Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText

image.png
image.png

Notes: At 03:42:32 PS ID 4104 captures: Get-DomainUser -Identity sqlsvc | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat Attacker first ran Get-DomainUser -SPN at 03:37:19 to list all SPN accounts, then targeted sqlsvc specifically for Kerberoasting.


Q08 — When did the attacker first use the cracked credentials to log in? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-05-25 04:03:47

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
sqlsvc Event.System.EventID=4624
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime    path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser    path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID       path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Computer      path="Event.System.Computer"
| spath input=_raw output=LogonType     path="Event.EventData.LogonType"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Computer, TargetUser, LogonType
| sort SystemTime

image.png
image.png

Notes: Win ID 4624 — Logon Type 3 (Network) via NTLM V2 from 192.168.204.152 → Client03. No WorkstationName, no ProcessName, no LogonGuid = Impacket from Linux. Hash cracked in ~26 minutes — weak service account password.


Q09 — What is the executable associated with the first service created by a Sysinternals tool following the attacker’s initial login?

Answer: VgYTbFEK.exe

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:03:47*"
"Event.EventData.User"!="MAIN\\asmith" Event.System.EventID=11
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
        Event.EventData.TargetFilename, Event.EventData.Image,
        Event.EventData.User
| sort Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime
| dedup Event.EventData.Image

image.png
image.png

Notes: PsExec (Sysinternals) creates a randomly-named service binary in C:\Windows\ on the remote target. The random name is deliberate — avoids hash-based AV detection. Sysmon ID 11 (File Create) is the forensic artifact. Filter after sqlsvc first-login timestamp and exclude known user asmith to isolate attacker activity.


Q10 — On Client03, what was the file name of the executable used to dump cleartext credentials from memory?

Answer: netdiag.exe

Splunk Query:

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:05:12*"
Event.System.EventID=1
"Event.EventData.Description"="mimikatz for Windows"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.ParentImage,
        Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.Description,
        Event.EventData.OriginalFileName, Event.EventData.User,
        Event.EventData.IntegrityLevel, Event.EventData.Hashes

image.png
image.png

Notes: Attacker renamed mimikatz.exe to netdiag.exe to evade detection (T1036 — Masquerading). Sysmon ID 1 exposes this because it captures the PE header metadata regardless of filename — fields OriginalFileName, Description, and Product still show mimikatz. Renaming a file on disk does not change its internal metadata. Process ran as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, spawned by powershell.exe (SysWOW64).


Q11 — What is the username of the account whose cleartext password was found on Client03?

Answer: lucas

Tool: Hayabusa / Timeline Explorer

image.png
image.png

Splunk Query

source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" runas.exe  "Event.System.EventID"=1
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=RuleName path="Event.EventData.RuleName"
| spath input=_raw output=CurrentDirectory path="Event.EventData.CurrentDirectory" 
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine" 
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| table SystemTime, RuleName, CurrentDirectory,EventID, CommandLine

image.png
image.png

Notes: Hayabusa automatically flagged this as Pass the Hash Activity 2 (medium) on Client03 at 04:24:47. The attacker authenticated as lucas from 192.168.204.152 (C2 server) via Logon Type 3 (Network) with a blank SrcComp — signature of Impacket from Linux using the NTLM hash.

The attacker used the hash first (Pass the Hash) to access Client03, then immediately ran netdiag.exe (mimikatz) at 04:25:19 — 32 seconds later — to upgrade from hash to cleartext password by dumping LSASS memory.

runas.exe /user:Main\lucas cmd forced Windows to cache lucas cleartext into LSASS, making it available to mimikatz.

Key Fields of EventID 4624

Key ID 4624 fields:
TgtUser  : lucas
SrcIP    : 192.168.204.152   ← C2 server
SrcComp  : -                 ← Impacket / Linux
LogonType: 3 - NETWORK
Rule     : Pass the Hash Activity 2

Q12 — When did the attacker perform the DCSync attack? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-05-25 04:26:36

Tool: Hayabusa / Timeline Explorer

image.png
image.png

Notes: Hayabusa flagged Mimikatz DC Sync (high) on DC01 at 04:26:36. User lucas (attacker) performed a DCSync attack using netdiag.exe (mimikatz) — abusing DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights to replicate password hashes from DC01. This is confirmed by Sysmon ID 22 (DNS query for DC01.Main.local) followed by ID 3 network connections to 192.168.204.163:135 (RPC) and :49668 (dynamic RPC / DCSync channel). At this point the attacker has every hash in the domain including krbtgt and Administrator.


Q13 — At what time did the attacker initially authenticate using the Administrator account? (UTC)

Answer: 2025-05-25 04:36:01

Splunk Query:

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" Event.System.EventID=4624 administrator
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime    path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser    path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID       path="Event.System.EventID"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:26:36.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, TargetUser, EventID
| sort SystemTime

image.png
image.png

Notes: Filter on ID 4624 with keyword administrator and time after DCSync (04:26:36). First result is the initial Administrator login — attacker used the Domain Admin hash obtained from DCSync to authenticate. NTLM V2, Logon Type 3 from 192.168.204.152.


Q14 — What is the name of the service created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?

Answer: WindowsUpdateSvc

Splunk Query:

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime  path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID     path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=UserName    path="Event.EventData.ParentUser"
| search EventID=1
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
      AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| search "Event.EventData.ParentUser"="MAIN\\Administrator"
| table SystemTime, UserName, EventID, CommandLine
| sort SystemTime

image.png
image.png

Notes: Attacker created a Windows service via sc.exe at 04:43:01 as MAIN\Administrator pointing to the malicious binary scvhost.exe (typosquat of svchost.exe — T1036) with start= auto — survives every reboot automatically.

sc.exe create WindowsUpdateSvc binPath= C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe start= auto

Q15 — What is the name of the scheduled task created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?

Answer: WindowsUpdateCheck

Splunk Query:

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime  path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID     path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=UserName    path="Event.EventData.ParentUser"
| search EventID=1
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
      AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| search "Event.EventData.ParentUser"="MAIN\\Administrator"
| table SystemTime, UserName, EventID, CommandLine
| sort SystemTime

image.png
image.png

Notes: Same query as Q14 — all persistence mechanisms visible in the same result set. Attacker ran schtasks.exe /query first at 04:38:19 to recon existing tasks, then created WindowsUpdateCheck pointing to scvhost.exe running as SYSTEM on every system start.

schtasks.exe /create /tn WindowsUpdateCheck /tr C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM /f

Q16 — What is the registry key name created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?

Answer: xcvafctr

Splunk Query:

index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime    path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine   path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID       path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Image         path="Event.EventData.Image"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetObject  path="Event.EventData.TargetObject"
| search EventID=13 AND Event.EventData.Image="*reg.exe"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
      AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Image, TargetObject

image.png
image.png

Notes: Sysmon ID 12/13/14 — Registry Events track object creation/deletion, value set operations, and renaming — commonly used by attackers for persistence. Filter on ID 13 (Registry Value Set) and reg.exe to isolate the attacker’s registry write. The TargetObject field shows the full registry path including the key name xcvafctr.

reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v xcvafctr /t REG_SZ /d C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /f

Triple persistence installed — if one mechanism is removed, the other two survive.


Investigation Notes

  • Sysmon ID 15 → Profits.docm download confirmed with HostUrl
  • Sysmon ID 3 → C2 callbacks on ports 4444 and 1337 confirmed
  • PS ID 4104 → PowerView fileless execution confirmed
  • Kerberoasting → sqlsvc hash extracted and cracked in ~26 min
  • Pass the Hash → lucas credentials obtained and LSASS dumped
  • DCSync → all domain hashes replicated from DC01 at 04:26:36
  • Domain Admin access → Administrator first login at 04:36:01
  • Triple persistence on DC01 → Service + Scheduled Task + Registry Run key

Key Concepts

Concept Explanation
MotW / ZonID=3 NTFS ADS tracking file origin. Propagates to every copy — Word temp files inherit it, generating ID 15 events traceable through the file lifecycle.
Sysmon ID 15 Fires on every ADS write. HostUrl present = download complete. Follow the chain to reconstruct file movement from download through execution.
Protected View Word AppContainer sandbox. oice_* temp path = passive open. ~WRD*.tmp created only when user exits Protected View = execution trigger.
PS ID 4104 Script Block Logging captures actual PS code including obfuscated/in-memory scripts. Large tools share same ActivityID + PID across all blocks.
Kerberoasting Any domain user can request a Kerberos ticket for any SPN account. Encrypted portion cracked offline — no lockout, no elevated rights required.
ID 4624 Fingerprinting Logon Type 3 + NTLM V2 + blank WorkstationName + blank ProcessName + zero LogonGuid = Impacket from Linux.
Pass the Hash Authenticate using NTLM hash without knowing the plaintext password. Detected by Hayabusa Pass the Hash Activity 2 rule.
DCSync Mimikatz abuses MS-DRSR replication protocol to pull all domain hashes from DC. Detected by ID 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID.
T1036 Masquerading Renaming malicious binary to look legitimate. Sysmon ID 1 exposes it via PE header metadata — OriginalFileName survives rename.
PsExec Service Binary Creates randomly-named binary in C:\Windows\ — random name defeats hash-based AV. Sysmon ID 11 is the forensic artifact.
Typosquatting scvhost.exe vs svchost.exe — one character difference. Designed to blend in when someone glances at a process list.

Event ID Reference

Source ID Description Security Context
Windows 4624 Successful Logon Check Logon Type — 2=local, 3=network, 9=runas/netonly, 10=RDP
Windows 4634 Logoff Session duration; match with 4624
Windows 4662 Object Operation DCSync detection — check for replication GUIDs
Windows 4672 Special Privileges Assigned Admin-level logon confirmation
Windows 4688 New Process Created Full command-line tracking
Windows 4689 Process Terminated Match with 4688 for duration
Windows 4738 User Account Changed Password resets, persistence
Windows 4769 Kerberos Service Ticket Requested Kerberoasting / Silver Ticket — check encryption type
Windows 4776 NTLM Authentication DC credential validation
Windows 5322 Account Locked Out Brute force / password spray
PShell 4103 Module Logging Pipeline execution details (verbose)
PShell 4104 Script Block Logging Critical — records actual PS code executed
Sysmon 1 Process Creation Parent process, full cmdline, file hash
Sysmon 3 Network Connection Maps PID → IP:Port
Sysmon 5 Process Terminated Match with ID 1 for execution duration
Sysmon 7 Image Loaded DLL loads — detect injection and side-loading
Sysmon 10 Process Access LSASS access — credential dumping detection
Sysmon 11 File Create When and where a file was written to disk
Sysmon 12/13/14 Registry Events Object create/delete, value set, rename — persistence detection
Sysmon 15 FileCreateStreamHash (ADS) MotW tracking — HostUrl present = download complete
Sysmon 22 DNS Query Process DNS resolution — C2 and lateral movement detection

Lessons Learned

What the attacker did well

  • Renamed mimikatz to a legitimate-sounding name (netdiag.exe) — would bypass basic AV signature detection
  • Used fileless execution (PowerView loaded entirely in memory) — no binary on disk to scan
  • Triple persistence on DC01 — removing one mechanism leaves two active
  • Typosquatted svchost.exe → scvhost.exe — blends into process lists

What the defender missed

  • Weak password on sqlsvc — cracked in ~26 minutes via Kerberoasting
  • WDigest enabled on Client03 — allowed cleartext caching in LSASS
  • No alerting on DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All from a non-DC account
  • No alerting on NTLM authentication from Linux hosts (192.168.204.152)
Finding Mitigation
Kerberoasting on sqlsvc Use strong passwords (25+ chars) on service accounts · enable AES encryption for SPNs · use gMSA accounts
Cleartext in LSASS Disable WDigest — HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential = 0
DCSync from non-DC Alert on EID 4662 with replication GUIDs from non-machine accounts · use Privileged Access Workstations
NTLM from Linux Enforce Kerberos — disable NTLM or alert on NTLM from non-domain hosts
Macro execution Disable macros via Group Policy · enable Attack Surface Reduction rules
Credential dumping Enable LSA Protection — HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL = 1
Persistence undetected Monitor EID 4697 (service install) + Sysmon ID 12/13 (registry) with SIEM alerting

Key takeaway

The attacker went from a phishing email to full domain compromise in under 40 minutes because of three compounding failures: a macro-enabled document reached the user, a service account had a weak password, and WDigest was enabled. Each failure alone is recoverable — together they enabled a complete domain takeover.

HTB Sherlock · GhostTrace · DFIR · 2026-01-07

ghosttrace_cdsa_report