GhostTrace- Claude Sherlock Walkthrough
Full domain takeover from a phishing macro: attack chain reconstruction through Sysmon, PowerShell logging and Splunk queries — including Kerberoasting, DCSync and triple persistence.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Category | DFIR |
| Difficulty | — |
| Status | ✅ Completed |
| Date | 2026-01-07 |
| Hosts | Client02 · Client03 · DC01 |
| Stack | Windows Event Logs · Sysmon · Splunk · Hayabusa · Chainsaw |
Scenario
Blue team investigation of a suspected breach in an Active Directory environment named Main.local.
The network includes a Domain Controller (DC01) and two client machines (Client02, Client03).
A user on Client03 received a phishing email leading to a series of attacks that compromised the domain.
Objective: reconstruct the attack chain, identify attacker actions, and uncover credentials, hashes, and
persistence mechanisms using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon logs.
Attack Chain
| # | Timestamp (UTC) | Process | Action | Artifact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | 2025-05-25 03:27:50 | chrome.exe |
Malicious file downloaded | Profits.docm ← ZonID=3 stamped · Sysmon ID 15 |
| 02 | 2025-05-25 03:28:04 | WINWORD.EXE |
Opened in Protected View (sandbox) | 140460DD.docm in oice_* temp · passive open |
| 03 | 2025-05-25 03:28:58 | WINWORD.EXE |
User enables macros — exits Protected View | ~WRD0000.tmp created → VBA executes ⚠️ |
| 04 | 2025-05-25 03:29:04 | WINWORD.EXE |
Reverse shell — C2 callback | 192.168.204.152:4444 · Meterpreter · Sysmon ID 3 |
| 05 | 2025-05-25 03:32:15 | powershell.exe |
Second-stage payload downloaded | UpdatePolicy.exe → port 1337 reverse shell · PS ID 4104 |
| 06 | 2025-05-25 03:37:05 | powershell.exe |
AD recon tool downloaded | PowerView.ps1 · PS ID 4104 |
| 07 | 2025-05-25 03:37:19 | powershell.exe |
AD enumeration — SPN accounts | Get-DomainUser -SPN · PID 7924 · block 8/70 · fileless |
| 08 | 2025-05-25 03:42:32 | powershell.exe |
Kerberoasting — ticket extracted | `Get-DomainUser -Identity sqlsvc |
| 09 | 2025-05-25 04:03:47 | — (Impacket) |
First login as sqlsvc — hash cracked |
NTLM V2 · Logon Type 3 · 192.168.204.152 → Client03 · ~26 min to crack |
| 10 | 2025-05-25 04:05:12 | VgYTbFEK.exe |
PsExec service binary created on Client03 | C:\Windows\VgYTbFEK.exe · random name → avoids hash AV · Sysmon ID 11 |
| 11 | 2025-05-25 04:24:47 | — (Impacket) |
Pass the Hash — lucas session on Client03 | NTLM V2 · 192.168.204.152 → Client03 · Hayabusa flagged |
| 12 | 2025-05-25 04:25:19 | powershell.exe |
Mimikatz executed as netdiag.exe — LSASS dumped |
T1036 masquerade · DLL injection · NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM |
| 13 | 2025-05-25 04:26:36 | netdiag.exe |
DCSync — AD replication to DC01 | 192.168.204.163:135 → :49668 · ID 4662 · T1003.006 |
| 14 | 2025-05-25 04:36:01 | — (Impacket) |
First login as Administrator — DA hash used |
NTLM V2 · Logon Type 3 · ID 4624 |
| 15 | 2025-05-25 04:38:53 | schtasks.exe |
Scheduled task created for persistence | WindowsUpdateCheck → scvhost.exe · /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM |
| 16 | 2025-05-25 04:40:09 | reg.exe |
Registry Run key created for persistence | HKCU\...\Run\xcvafctr → scvhost.exe |
| 17 | 2025-05-25 04:43:01 | sc.exe |
Windows service created for persistence | WindowsUpdateSvc → scvhost.exe · start= auto |
Key IOCs
| Type | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| C2 / Staging Server | 192.168.204.152 |
Internal IP — served all payloads |
| Initial Payload | Profits.docm |
Macro-enabled Word doc · phishing lure |
| C2 Ports | 4444 / 1337 |
4444 = Meterpreter · 1337 = UpdatePolicy.exe shell |
| Second Stage | UpdatePolicy.exe |
Downloaded via Invoke-WebRequest |
| Recon Tool | PowerView.ps1 |
PowerSploit · @harmj0y · loaded fileless |
| Compromised Account | MAIN\sqlsvc |
Service account · SPN set · Kerberoasted · weak password |
| Lateral Binary | VgYTbFEK.exe |
PsExec random-name service binary · C:\Windows\ |
| Credential Dumper | netdiag.exe |
Mimikatz renamed · T1036 masquerading |
| Compromised Account | lucas |
Cleartext dumped from LSASS via Pass the Hash + runas |
| Persistence Binary | scvhost.exe |
Typosquat of svchost.exe · C:\Windows\System32\ |
| Persistence — Service | WindowsUpdateSvc |
Auto-start Windows service |
| Persistence — Task | WindowsUpdateCheck |
Scheduled task on system start as SYSTEM |
| Persistence — Registry | xcvafctr |
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run |
Questions & Answers
Q01 — What is the name of the malicious phishing attachment downloaded by the user on Client02?
Answer: Profits.docm
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=15
"Event.System.Channel"="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
Event.EventData.TargetFilename,
Event.EventData.Contents, Event.EventData.User
Notes:
Sysmon ID 15 (FileCreateStreamHash) fires on every ADS write.
The HostUrl field only appears in the Zone.Identifier once the download is complete —
this is the event that confirms both the filename and the source URL.
Q02 — What is the IP address from which the malicious attachment was downloaded?
Answer: 192.168.204.152
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local" Event.System.EventID=15
| rex field=Event.EventData.Contents "HostUrl=(?<HostUrl>[^\s]+)"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.TargetFilename, HostUrl
Notes:
Answer is embedded in the Zone.Identifier ADS contents from Q01.
Use rex to extract the HostUrl field cleanly — the URL contains the full source IP.
Q03 — After the victim opened the file, the malware initiated a network connection. What is the IP and port?
Answer: 192.168.204.152:4444
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local" 192.168.204.152 Event.System.EventID=3
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
Event.EventData.User, Event.EventData.SourceIp,
Event.EventData.SourcePort, Event.EventData.DestinationIp,
Event.EventData.DestinationPort
Notes:
Sysmon ID 3 (Network Connection) maps PID → IP:Port.
Macro executed at 03:28:58, first C2 callback at 03:29:04 to port 4444 — classic Meterpreter default.
Filter by known C2 IP to reduce noise.
Q04 — What is the name of the second-stage payload uploaded to Client02?
Answer: UpdatePolicy.exe
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 UpdatePolicy.exe Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText
Notes:
PS ID 4104 captured the Invoke-WebRequest download command.
File written to C:\Users\Jody\Downloads\UpdatePolicy.exe between 03:32:02–03:32:15.
Filtering by the C2 IP + filename narrows results quickly.
Q05 — What port was used for the reverse shell from the second-stage payload on Client02?
Answer: 1337
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
Event.System.EventID=3 UpdatePolicy.exe
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.Image,
Event.EventData.DestinationIp, Event.EventData.DestinationPort
| where Event.EventData.DestinationPort != 4444
Notes:
Visible in Q03 results. UpdatePolicy.exe connects on port 1337 — separate from Meterpreter on 4444.
Two simultaneous C2 channels. Excluding port 4444 isolates the second shell cleanly.
Q06 — What tool did the attacker download to enumerate Active Directory?
Answer: PowerView.ps1
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client02.Main.local"
192.168.204.152 "Event.System.EventID"=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText
Notes:
PS ID 4104 shows Invoke-WebRequest downloading PowerView.ps1 at 03:37:05.
PowerView is a PowerSploit module by @harmj0y used for AD enumeration and Kerberoasting.
Loaded entirely in memory across 70 script blocks sharing the same ActivityID and PID 7924.
Q07 — What is the username of the targeted service account?
Answer: sqlsvc
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Get-DomainUser -Identity" Event.System.EventID=4104
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
Event.EventData.ScriptBlockText
Notes:
At 03:42:32 PS ID 4104 captures:
Get-DomainUser -Identity sqlsvc | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat
Attacker first ran Get-DomainUser -SPN at 03:37:19 to list all SPN accounts,
then targeted sqlsvc specifically for Kerberoasting.
Q08 — When did the attacker first use the cracked credentials to log in? (UTC)
Answer: 2025-05-25 04:03:47
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
sqlsvc Event.System.EventID=4624
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Computer path="Event.System.Computer"
| spath input=_raw output=LogonType path="Event.EventData.LogonType"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Computer, TargetUser, LogonType
| sort SystemTime
Notes:
Win ID 4624 — Logon Type 3 (Network) via NTLM V2 from 192.168.204.152 → Client03.
No WorkstationName, no ProcessName, no LogonGuid = Impacket from Linux.
Hash cracked in ~26 minutes — weak service account password.
Q09 — What is the executable associated with the first service created by a Sysinternals tool following the attacker’s initial login?
Answer: VgYTbFEK.exe
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:03:47*"
"Event.EventData.User"!="MAIN\\asmith" Event.System.EventID=11
| table Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime,
Event.EventData.TargetFilename, Event.EventData.Image,
Event.EventData.User
| sort Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime
| dedup Event.EventData.Image
Notes:
PsExec (Sysinternals) creates a randomly-named service binary in C:\Windows\ on the remote target. The random name is deliberate — avoids hash-based AV detection. Sysmon ID 11 (File Create) is the forensic artifact. Filter after sqlsvc first-login timestamp and exclude known user asmith to isolate attacker activity.
Q10 — On Client03, what was the file name of the executable used to dump cleartext credentials from memory?
Answer: netdiag.exe
Splunk Query:
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
"Event.System.Computer"="Client03.Main.local"
Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime>"2025-05-25T04:05:12*"
Event.System.EventID=1
"Event.EventData.Description"="mimikatz for Windows"
| table Event.EventData.UtcTime, Event.EventData.ParentImage,
Event.EventData.Image, Event.EventData.Description,
Event.EventData.OriginalFileName, Event.EventData.User,
Event.EventData.IntegrityLevel, Event.EventData.Hashes
Notes:
Attacker renamed mimikatz.exe to netdiag.exe to evade detection (T1036 — Masquerading).
Sysmon ID 1 exposes this because it captures the PE header metadata regardless of filename —
fields OriginalFileName, Description, and Product still show mimikatz.
Renaming a file on disk does not change its internal metadata.
Process ran as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, spawned by powershell.exe (SysWOW64).
Q11 — What is the username of the account whose cleartext password was found on Client03?
Answer: lucas
Tool: Hayabusa / Timeline Explorer
Splunk Query
source="ghostrace_dump_all.json" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" runas.exe "Event.System.EventID"=1
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=RuleName path="Event.EventData.RuleName"
| spath input=_raw output=CurrentDirectory path="Event.EventData.CurrentDirectory"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| table SystemTime, RuleName, CurrentDirectory,EventID, CommandLine
Notes:
Hayabusa automatically flagged this as Pass the Hash Activity 2 (medium) on Client03 at 04:24:47. The attacker authenticated as lucas from 192.168.204.152 (C2 server) via Logon Type 3 (Network) with a blank SrcComp — signature of Impacket from Linux using the NTLM hash.
The attacker used the hash first (Pass the Hash) to access Client03, then immediately ran netdiag.exe (mimikatz) at 04:25:19 — 32 seconds later — to upgrade from hash to cleartext password by dumping LSASS memory.
runas.exe /user:Main\lucas cmd forced Windows to cache lucas cleartext into LSASS, making it available to mimikatz.
Key Fields of EventID 4624
Key ID 4624 fields:
TgtUser : lucas
SrcIP : 192.168.204.152 ← C2 server
SrcComp : - ← Impacket / Linux
LogonType: 3 - NETWORK
Rule : Pass the Hash Activity 2
Q12 — When did the attacker perform the DCSync attack? (UTC)
Answer: 2025-05-25 04:26:36
Tool: Hayabusa / Timeline Explorer
Notes:
Hayabusa flagged Mimikatz DC Sync (high) on DC01 at 04:26:36. User lucas (attacker) performed a DCSync attack using netdiag.exe (mimikatz) — abusing DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All rights to replicate password hashes from DC01. This is confirmed by Sysmon ID 22 (DNS query for DC01.Main.local) followed by ID 3 network connections to 192.168.204.163:135 (RPC) and :49668 (dynamic RPC / DCSync channel). At this point the attacker has every hash in the domain including krbtgt and Administrator.
Q13 — At what time did the attacker initially authenticate using the Administrator account? (UTC)
Answer: 2025-05-25 04:36:01
Splunk Query:
index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json" Event.System.EventID=4624 administrator
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetUser path="Event.EventData.TargetUserName"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:26:36.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, TargetUser, EventID
| sort SystemTime
Notes:
Filter on ID 4624 with keyword administrator and time after DCSync (04:26:36).
First result is the initial Administrator login — attacker used the Domain Admin hash
obtained from DCSync to authenticate. NTLM V2, Logon Type 3 from 192.168.204.152.
Q14 — What is the name of the service created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?
Answer: WindowsUpdateSvc
Splunk Query:
index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=UserName path="Event.EventData.ParentUser"
| search EventID=1
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| search "Event.EventData.ParentUser"="MAIN\\Administrator"
| table SystemTime, UserName, EventID, CommandLine
| sort SystemTime
Notes:
Attacker created a Windows service via sc.exe at 04:43:01 as MAIN\Administrator
pointing to the malicious binary scvhost.exe (typosquat of svchost.exe — T1036) with start= auto — survives every reboot automatically.
sc.exe create WindowsUpdateSvc binPath= C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe start= auto
Q15 — What is the name of the scheduled task created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?
Answer: WindowsUpdateCheck
Splunk Query:
index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=UserName path="Event.EventData.ParentUser"
| search EventID=1
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| search "Event.EventData.ParentUser"="MAIN\\Administrator"
| table SystemTime, UserName, EventID, CommandLine
| sort SystemTime
Notes:
Same query as Q14 — all persistence mechanisms visible in the same result set.
Attacker ran schtasks.exe /query first at 04:38:19 to recon existing tasks, then created
WindowsUpdateCheck pointing to scvhost.exe running as SYSTEM on every system start.
schtasks.exe /create /tn WindowsUpdateCheck /tr C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM /f
Q16 — What is the registry key name created by the attacker on DC01 for persistence?
Answer: xcvafctr
Splunk Query:
index="main" host="parrot" sourcetype="_json"
| spath input=_raw output=SystemTime path="Event.System.TimeCreated_attributes.SystemTime"
| spath input=_raw output=CommandLine path="Event.EventData.CommandLine"
| spath input=_raw output=EventID path="Event.System.EventID"
| spath input=_raw output=Image path="Event.EventData.Image"
| spath input=_raw output=TargetObject path="Event.EventData.TargetObject"
| search EventID=13 AND Event.EventData.Image="*reg.exe"
| where SystemTime > "2025-05-25T04:36:01.000000Z"
AND SystemTime < "2025-05-25T04:48:00.000000Z"
| table SystemTime, EventID, Image, TargetObject
Notes:
Sysmon ID 12/13/14 — Registry Events track object creation/deletion, value set operations,
and renaming — commonly used by attackers for persistence.
Filter on ID 13 (Registry Value Set) and reg.exe to isolate the attacker’s registry write.
The TargetObject field shows the full registry path including the key name xcvafctr.
reg.exe add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v xcvafctr /t REG_SZ /d C:\Windows\System32\scvhost.exe /f
Triple persistence installed — if one mechanism is removed, the other two survive.
Investigation Notes
- Sysmon
ID 15→Profits.docmdownload confirmed withHostUrl - Sysmon
ID 3→ C2 callbacks on ports4444and1337confirmed - PS
ID 4104→ PowerView fileless execution confirmed - Kerberoasting →
sqlsvchash extracted and cracked in ~26 min - Pass the Hash →
lucascredentials obtained and LSASS dumped - DCSync → all domain hashes replicated from DC01 at
04:26:36 - Domain Admin access →
Administratorfirst login at04:36:01 - Triple persistence on DC01 → Service + Scheduled Task + Registry Run key
Key Concepts
| Concept | Explanation |
|---|---|
MotW / ZonID=3 |
NTFS ADS tracking file origin. Propagates to every copy — Word temp files inherit it, generating ID 15 events traceable through the file lifecycle. |
Sysmon ID 15 |
Fires on every ADS write. HostUrl present = download complete. Follow the chain to reconstruct file movement from download through execution. |
Protected View |
Word AppContainer sandbox. oice_* temp path = passive open. ~WRD*.tmp created only when user exits Protected View = execution trigger. |
PS ID 4104 |
Script Block Logging captures actual PS code including obfuscated/in-memory scripts. Large tools share same ActivityID + PID across all blocks. |
Kerberoasting |
Any domain user can request a Kerberos ticket for any SPN account. Encrypted portion cracked offline — no lockout, no elevated rights required. |
ID 4624 Fingerprinting |
Logon Type 3 + NTLM V2 + blank WorkstationName + blank ProcessName + zero LogonGuid = Impacket from Linux. |
Pass the Hash |
Authenticate using NTLM hash without knowing the plaintext password. Detected by Hayabusa Pass the Hash Activity 2 rule. |
DCSync |
Mimikatz abuses MS-DRSR replication protocol to pull all domain hashes from DC. Detected by ID 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUID. |
T1036 Masquerading |
Renaming malicious binary to look legitimate. Sysmon ID 1 exposes it via PE header metadata — OriginalFileName survives rename. |
PsExec Service Binary |
Creates randomly-named binary in C:\Windows\ — random name defeats hash-based AV. Sysmon ID 11 is the forensic artifact. |
Typosquatting |
scvhost.exe vs svchost.exe — one character difference. Designed to blend in when someone glances at a process list. |
Event ID Reference
| Source | ID | Description | Security Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows | 4624 |
Successful Logon | Check Logon Type — 2=local, 3=network, 9=runas/netonly, 10=RDP |
| Windows | 4634 |
Logoff | Session duration; match with 4624 |
| Windows | 4662 |
Object Operation | DCSync detection — check for replication GUIDs |
| Windows | 4672 |
Special Privileges Assigned | Admin-level logon confirmation |
| Windows | 4688 |
New Process Created | Full command-line tracking |
| Windows | 4689 |
Process Terminated | Match with 4688 for duration |
| Windows | 4738 |
User Account Changed | Password resets, persistence |
| Windows | 4769 |
Kerberos Service Ticket Requested | Kerberoasting / Silver Ticket — check encryption type |
| Windows | 4776 |
NTLM Authentication | DC credential validation |
| Windows | 5322 |
Account Locked Out | Brute force / password spray |
| PShell | 4103 |
Module Logging | Pipeline execution details (verbose) |
| PShell | 4104 |
Script Block Logging | Critical — records actual PS code executed |
| Sysmon | 1 |
Process Creation | Parent process, full cmdline, file hash |
| Sysmon | 3 |
Network Connection | Maps PID → IP:Port |
| Sysmon | 5 |
Process Terminated | Match with ID 1 for execution duration |
| Sysmon | 7 |
Image Loaded | DLL loads — detect injection and side-loading |
| Sysmon | 10 |
Process Access | LSASS access — credential dumping detection |
| Sysmon | 11 |
File Create | When and where a file was written to disk |
| Sysmon | 12/13/14 |
Registry Events | Object create/delete, value set, rename — persistence detection |
| Sysmon | 15 |
FileCreateStreamHash (ADS) | MotW tracking — HostUrl present = download complete |
| Sysmon | 22 |
DNS Query | Process DNS resolution — C2 and lateral movement detection |
Lessons Learned
What the attacker did well
- Renamed mimikatz to a legitimate-sounding name (
netdiag.exe) — would bypass basic AV signature detection - Used fileless execution (PowerView loaded entirely in memory) — no binary on disk to scan
- Triple persistence on DC01 — removing one mechanism leaves two active
- Typosquatted
svchost.exe→scvhost.exe— blends into process lists
What the defender missed
- Weak password on
sqlsvc— cracked in ~26 minutes via Kerberoasting - WDigest enabled on Client03 — allowed cleartext caching in LSASS
- No alerting on
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-Allfrom a non-DC account - No alerting on NTLM authentication from Linux hosts (
192.168.204.152)
Recommended mitigations
| Finding | Mitigation |
|---|---|
Kerberoasting on sqlsvc |
Use strong passwords (25+ chars) on service accounts · enable AES encryption for SPNs · use gMSA accounts |
| Cleartext in LSASS | Disable WDigest — HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest\\UseLogonCredential = 0 |
| DCSync from non-DC | Alert on EID 4662 with replication GUIDs from non-machine accounts · use Privileged Access Workstations |
| NTLM from Linux | Enforce Kerberos — disable NTLM or alert on NTLM from non-domain hosts |
| Macro execution | Disable macros via Group Policy · enable Attack Surface Reduction rules |
| Credential dumping | Enable LSA Protection — HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\RunAsPPL = 1 |
| Persistence undetected | Monitor EID 4697 (service install) + Sysmon ID 12/13 (registry) with SIEM alerting |
Key takeaway
The attacker went from a phishing email to full domain compromise in under 40 minutes because of three compounding failures: a macro-enabled document reached the user, a service account had a weak password, and WDigest was enabled. Each failure alone is recoverable — together they enabled a complete domain takeover.
HTB Sherlock · GhostTrace · DFIR · 2026-01-07