Campfire-1 Sherlock Walkthrough
DFIR walkthrough of a Kerberoasting attack on a domain controller: Sigma hunting with Chainsaw, PowerShell script block logging, and Prefetch forensics with PECmd.
Solved Campfire-1 from Hack The Box!
Scenario
Alonzo Spotted Weird files on his computer and informed the newly assembled SOC Team. Assessing the situation it is believed a Kerberoasting attack may have occurred in the network. It is your job to confirm the findings by analyzing the provided evidence.
You are provided with:
1- Security Logs from the Domain Controller
2- PowerShell-Operational Logs from the affected workstation
3- Prefetch Files from the affected workstation
Q1 — Analyzing Domain Controller Security Logs, can you confirm the UTC date & time when the kerberoasting activity occurred?
Answer 2024-05-21 03:18:09
chainsaw hunt SECURITY-DC.evtx -s ~/tools/hayabusa/rules/sigma -r ~/tools/hayabusa/rules --mapping ~/tools/chainsaw/mappings/sigma-event-logs-all.yml
Chainsaw automatically detected Kerberoasting activity by matching Sigma rules against the Domain Controller security logs.
Sysmon Event ID 4769 — Kerberos Service Ticket Request
Key fields:
Timestamp: 2024-05-21 03:18:09 UTC
Computer: DC01.forela.local
TargetUserName: alonzo.spire@FORELA.LOC
ServiceName: MSSQLService
TicketEncryptionType: 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) ← weak encryption, kerberoastable
TicketOptions: 0x40800000
IpAddress: 172.17.79.129
IpPort: 58107
The encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) is the key indicator of Kerberoasting. An attacker requests a service ticket for MSSQLService using weak RC4 encryption instead of AES — the ticket can then be
extracted and cracked offline to reveal the service account password
Q2 — What is the Service Name that was targeted?
Answer MSSQLService
Identified directly from the Chainsaw output in Q1. Event ID 4769 field ServiceName: MSSQLService MSSQLService is a Microsoft SQL Server service account. Service accounts running under domain credentials are prime Kerberoasting targets because they have SPNs (Service Principal Names) registered in Active Directory, allowing any domain user to request a service ticket and attempt offline cracking.
Q3 — It is really important to identify the Workstation from which this activity occurred. What is the IP Address of the workstation?
Answer 172.17.79.129
Identified directly from the Chainsaw output in Q1. Event ID 4769 field IpAddress: ::ffff:172.17.79.129 the actual workstation IP is 172.17.79.129. This is the machine from which alonzo.spire ran the Kerberoasting attack.
Q4 — Now that we have identified the workstation, a triage including PowerShell logs and Prefetch files are provided to you for some deeper insights so we can understand how this activity occurred on the endpoint. What is the name of the file used to Enumerate Active directory objects and possibly find Kerberoastable accounts in the network?
Answer PowerView.ps1
cat campfire.json| jq 'select(.EventID == 4104) | "\(.Timestamp)--> \(.ExtraFieldInfo.Path)"' | sort | uniq -c
Event ID 4104 — PowerShell Script Block Logging captures all executed PowerShell scripts including their full path.
Filtered campfire.json for ID 4104 and extracted the script path. Results show powerview.ps1 executed by alonzo.spire from: C:\Users\alonzo.spire\Downloads\powerview.ps1
Execution pattern:
2024-05-21 03:16:32 61 blocks logged simultaneously ← script loaded (all functions)
2024-05-21 03:17:23 5 blocks logged ← specific functions called
2024-05-21 03:17:25 2 blocks logged ← additional queries
PowerView is a PowerShell tool from the PowerSploit framework used for Active Directory enumeration.
It can identify Kerberoastable accounts by querying for service accounts with SPNs registered — exactly what was used here to find MSSQLService
before the Kerberoasting at 03:18:09.
Q5 — When was this script executed? (UTC)
Answer 2024-05-21 03:16:32
Identified from the same ID 4104 query used in Q4.
The first execution of powerview.ps1 was logged at: 2024-05-21 03:16:32.588 UTC
The 61 script blocks logged at this exact timestamp indicate the entire PowerView script was loaded into memory at once — all functions and modules initialised simultaneously.
Subsequent executions at 03:17:23 and 03:17:25 represent individual PowerView functions being called after the initial load.
Q6 — What is the full path of the tool used to perform the actual kerberoasting attack?
Answer C:\Users\Alonzo.spire\Downloads\Rubeus.exe
.\PECmd.exe -f C:\Users\user\Documents\htb\Campfire\prefetch\RUBEUS.EXE-5873E24B.pf
Files referenced: 109
00: \VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\NTDLL.DLL
01: \VOLUME{01d951602330db46-52233816}\USERS\ALONZO.SPIRE\DOWNLOADS\RUBEUS.EXE (Executable: True)
No evidence of Rubeus execution was found in Windows Event Logs —
Rubeus runs entirely in memory and avoids leaving obvious log traces.
The prefetch file RUBEUS.EXE-5873E24B.pf was identified in the
provided prefetch folder. Prefetch files are created by Windows
every time an executable runs, making them reliable evidence of
execution even when logs are absent.
Parsed with PECmd (Eric Zimmerman) on FlareVM:
Executable: RUBEUS.EXE
Full path: C:\Users\Alonzo.spire\Downloads\Rubeus.exe
Run count: 1
Last run: 2024-05-21 03:18:08 UTC
Rubeus is an open-source Kerberos attack toolkit. It can perform
Kerberoasting by requesting RC4-encrypted service tickets for
accounts with SPNs and dumping them for offline cracking — exactly
matching the ID 4769 event observed in Q1.
Q7 — When was the tool executed to dump credentials? (UTC)
Answer 2024-05-21 03:18:08
Processing C:\Users\user\Documents\htb\Campfire\prefetch\RUBEUS.EXE-5873E24B.pf
Created on: 2026-03-24 09:15:27
Modified on: 2024-05-21 03:18:09
Last accessed on: 2026-03-24 09:18:28
Executable name: RUBEUS.EXE
Hash: 5873E24B
File size (bytes): 86,612
Version: Windows 10 or Windows 11
Run count: 1
Last run: 2024-05-21 03:18:08
Identified from the same PECmd output used in Q6.
Prefetch file timestamps explained:
Created on: 2026-03-24 ← when the .pf file was copied to analysis machine
Modified on: 2024-05-21 03:18:09 ← when prefetch was last updated on victim
Last accessed: 2026-03-24 ← when we opened it for analysis
Last run: 2024-05-21 03:18:08 ← ACTUAL execution time on victim ← answer
The "Last run" field is the reliable timestamp — it records when
Rubeus.exe last executed on the victim machine.
This confirms the attack sequence with 1 second precision:
03:18:08 Rubeus.exe executed ← this question
03:18:09 ID 4769 logged on DC01 ← Kerberoasting detected in Q1
Rubeus ran at 03:18:08 and the domain controller logged the
malicious ticket request exactly 1 second later at 03:18:09